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Abstract
Contemporary theories of social emancipation contend that it is 
time to dispense with the concept of revolution and leave it 
merely as the legacy of political struggles belonging to the age  
of industrial economy. Today’s globalization, semio-capital, 
speculative design,2 crypto-economy, and artificial intelligence 
would engage epistemologically different emancipatory lexicons 
and techniques of resistance. All new futurisms posit 
1 Results incorporated in this publication have received funding from the Eu-
ropean Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie 
Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement № 752417.
2 Speculative design is a term coined by the designer Anthony Dunne in the 
1990s to define a form of social design that must question the cultural, social, and 
ethical implications of future technologies and “define the most desirable futures, 
avoiding the less desirable.” The term is applied in studies of algorithmic architecture, 
artificial intelligence, and post-human studies by Benjamin Bratton, Mark Wigley, Phil 
Balagtas, and others.
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technological solutions for hitherto political stakes. What 
remains unheeded in them is the existential need for cognitive 
equality and social continuity with the masses in constructing the 
collective subject of emancipation. Recent election results in the 
U.S., U.K., Eastern Europe, and Russia diagnose an immense 
cognitive rupture between the producers of emancipatory 
lexicons and disadvantaged workers. Such a split between mind 
and body was already made apparent in Hegel’s dialectics of lord 
and bondsman. In order to surpass this split, it is of utmost 
importance to reconsider the conditions in which the premature 
construction of the proletariat took place in the context  
of the October revolution. The proletariat was posited in this case 
not only as revolutionary subject, but as the principal subject  
of Enlightenment as well. 
Keywords
Acceleration, Ataraxia, Bondsman, Dictatorship of the Proletariat, 
Hegel, Lord, Semio-capital, Subject of Enlightenment
Introduction
In contemporary techno-oriented emancipatory programs, the idea 
of repoliticizing the social sphere — as well as the term revolution — 
is dismissed in favor of reprogramming the capitalist machine. Accelera-
tionist, cybernetic, xenofeminist, and ANT (Actor Network Theory) futur-
ologies alike identify techno-scientific development as a productive force 
capable of superceding political deadlocks. They privilege a redesign of 
the software of cognitive practices and technological inventions over pol-
itics — an idea that sounds rather more like a solidarity appeal to silicon 
valley workers than broad solidarity with the working masses or disen-
franchised social groups. While this defiance of revolution and of the po-
litical subject in techno-scientific theories of emancipation is justified 
on the grounds of the inevitable technological reconstitution of social 
agencies, such theories ignore the fact that it is to a considerable extent 
political will and existential and ontological need that is able to establish 
continuity with the unprivileged masses and delegate them the tools 
for social, economic, and cognitive subjectivation.
Interestingly, one of the primary demands of the October revolution 
was an overall — even coercive — equalization in knowledge and educa-
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tion. For Marx and Lenin, the proletariat is not merely the working class, 
struggling for political emancipation. It is the class which, despite its de-
privation, is able to prematurely acquire self-consciousness, i.e. to posit 
itself as a supreme subject of knowledge, and embody the most developed 
stage of consciousness — even ahead of any nominal grasp of the cogni-
tive outcomes, technologies, and productive forces that would allow it 
to reach such a developed stage. What facilitates this power for the prole-
tariat “ahead of time” is its dictatorship — the result of a revolutionary 
seizure of power. In the midst and aftermath of the October revolution, 
the goal of diminishing the split between mind and body had served as the 
focal point of struggle. The question is whether the contemporary en-
lightened cognitive producer is able to solve the problem of rupture 
by using lexicons of emancipation that divide society into a socially pro-
gressive “intelligentsia” and an obscurantist brain-washed masses — 




Knowledge, practices of mind, and proper legibility in technologies 
have today become the principal stumbling block that hampers the conti-
nuity and efficacy of emancipation; they manifest the extent to which 
emancipatory projections are dependent on certain lexicons and their 
cognitive accessibility and comprehensibility. Those who speak these lan-
guages are not the most oppressed; those who are most oppressed 
do not speak these languages. Under the conditions of semio-capital, 
knowledge and the general intellect have gradually become the chief form 
of property, wealth, and means of production — so that it is rather in-
equality in knowledge, which causes insult and resentment amongst 
the underprivileged layers of society. Those who elect conservative lead-
ers are less insulted by the luxury, smuggled property, corruption, and 
authority of those leaders, than they are by disregard on the part of the 
progressive intelligentsia, with their opaque lexicons of sophisticated 
culture, enlightenment, and education.3
The conservative turn that we witness today across multiple geopo-
litical regions is the proof that even the most emancipatory undertakings 
in art and culture have failed to make knowledge and intelligence appli-
3 Such a claim is substantiated by support among insecure and disenfran-
chised social groups for Brexit, the Trump presidency, the conservative “Georgian 
Dream” party in Georgia, and for Putin and the “United Russia” party, despite evidenc-
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cable for the disenfranchised masses. What makes the solidarity of cogni-
tive workers as the main emancipatory agency questionable is that the 
expansion of common good is identified in this case with broadened areas 
of applied knowledge by means of either new landscapes of design 
and logistics, or new speculative and artistically grounded intelligences. 
Yet such agencies remain heedless of the political and economic organs 
that would broaden the ethics of the common good. This automatically 
ascribes cognitive advancement to a specific social stratum — the techni-
cally and cognitively enlightened “intelligentsia” — which then, because 
of its intellectual legibility, remains the sole political subject of emanci-
pation.
Thus at stake is the unsurpassable rupture between a cognizing 
and accelerating advancement and the needs of the body and its condi-
tions of survival — a rupture that segregates the social classes and various 
geopolitical regions. Until recently, the agenda of many cultural institu-
tions was to pursue programs in social education or participatory initia-
tives with the aim of lubricating social antagonisms and cognitive and 
cultural inequalities. One of the achievements of cognitive capitalism, 
as it was thought, was accelerative growth and access of the masses to the 
general intellect. In accelerationism’s emancipatory programs, the idea of 
a revolutionary repoliticization of the social sphere was dismissed in fa-
vor of a reprogramming of the capitalist machine. Technological advance-
ment — i.e. soft sociality — was held to be capable of tackling political 
deadlocks better than body (folk) politics (Srnicek and Williams 2014: 
347–363). According to this standpoint, the efficacy of social emancipa-
tion lies in recreating/developing the software of cognitive practices and 
technological inventions, rather than in enacting political “choreogra-
phy” (Berardi 2017). This belief however reveals several aberrations; 
one of them being that, in the aforementioned theories, the subject of 
emancipation — as well as the subject of precarity, — is chiefly an intel-
lectual worker, whose task it is to retrieve the means of production from 
semio-capital and to rechannel them against neoliberal domination. Yet 
thus far, neither algorithmization and the cybernetic rebranding of social 
services and labor, nor the proliferation of the languages of political cri-
tique in the culture industry — even when presented as democratic and 
accessible — have duly been recognized by the laboring masses as the 
source of their enlightenment and welfare. Those most utterly deprived in 
this case become a merely formal component of emancipatory argumen-
tation. In fact, techno-futurist imaginaries have not managed to increase 
the domains of equality, despite access to free common digital consump-
tion. This is because the diverse resources of enlightenment and of cogni-
tive growth are not only a matter of access and consumption, but also 
of a certain social jargon, which, more often than not, has remained un-
translatable and hence blank for the majority of the population. This ten-
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dency leaves unheeded an insightful reminder from Maurizzio Lazzarato 
about the need to maintain an epistemological difference between tech-
nology/engineering on the one hand, and sociality, on the other (Lazzara-
to 2016). For Lazzarato, technology forms part of the war machine 
of capital, thus it should not be identified with sociality; technological 
progress does not necessarily imply social emancipation.
The aforementioned split between cognitive design and bodily socia-
bility diagnoses a paradoxical situation: the neoliberal technocratic elites 
and enlightened progressive cultural workers “happen” to be more so-
cially homogenous than the underprivileged masses and progressive in-
tellectual workers. Hence it is no surprise that neoliberal “democratic” 
governments, NGOs, and cultural institutions in almost all post-socialist 
countries have been overtaken by nationalist, anti-globalist, and “anti-
neoliberal” conservative oligarchies, which are often supported not only 
by former communist party remainders, but at times even by grassroots 
left communities.4 Openly expressing contempt for the global cultural 
or academic fields, these grassroots anti-globalists often regard conserva-
tive leaders, or even the heads of national oligarchies — Erdogan, Orban, 
Putin, Trump, Ivanishvili — as a Syriza-type resistance against global fi-
nancial and cultural bureaucratic elites. Therefore, only a more sophisti-
cated view of the conservative turn would allow us to see that traditional-
ism and the restitution of religion might not be a case of ardent faith 
or the protection of essentialist values. The real intention behind cultural 
traditionalism and regionalization is not the fight against modernity. 
On the contrary, it is often a revolt and resentment rooted in not being apt 
for enlightened and emancipated techno-contemporaneity and its lexi-
cons.
What is striking when watching the documentary materials of 
the Comintern congress of 1921 is that most of the brilliant communist 
proponents of proletarian revolution — Lenin, Radek, Trotsky — belonged 
to the middle class, the intelligentsia — to the enlightened bourgeoisie. 
Nonetheless, it was they who initiated the empowerment of the proletar-
iat as the universal subject of history, to then go on to institute its after-
revolutionary dictatorship. Such a disposition — that middle-class leftist 
cultural workers establish social continuity with the most disadvantaged 
working layers of society, and moreover, establish this subjugated subjec-
tivity as the avant-garde of emancipation and even of cognitive and tech-
4 For example, in 2012 major leftist parties and organizations in Georgia sup-
ported the party of oligarchic capital “Georgian Dream” against the previous pro-west-
ern (neo)liberal democratic government. In Russia, during the confrontation with the 
Ukraine, a well-known leftist organization, “The Institute of the Problems of Globaliza-
tion,” founded by sociologist and activist Boris Kagarlitsky, (although without any di-
rect support from the ruling party “United Russia”), gave explicit preference to Putin’s 
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nical production — would be unimaginable today. Should we ascribe this 
to a particular historical moment, to the proliferation of grassroots eman-
cipatory movements then and to their lack now? What is the proletariat 
as a political subject? Is it merely a politically organized class of laboring 
masses? Or does this concept bear on something more than merely social 
emancipation?
II 
The Ataraxia of Cognitive Emancipators
Hegel, in his short passage on the dialectics of lordship and bondage, 
touches upon a very subtle point of how and when the lord-bondsman 
dependency is sublated. He argues that the overcoming of this bond hap-
pens in Stoicism. As we recall from this passage (1977: 104–138), the lord 
is free from actual existence, does not have to do with it, and his con-
sciousness is therefore independent. The bondsman, on the contrary, 
is submerged in the production and formation of things — in existence — 
and hence, his consciousness is reified. The lord’s problem is nonetheless 
that while his consciousness is being for itself, is sovereign and universal, 
he still needs to consume, and hence retains a longing for the object 
world. Thus he needs “another consciousness”, that would deal with ac-
tual things in order to help him to mediate reality; the lord cannot access 
reality without the bondsman’s labor. His need of consumption and of the 
bondsman’s labor reveals that his independence of consciousness is not 
a true independence. Moreover, what is extremely important to note is 
that, as Hegel states, in confining his contact with the world to mere con-
sumption of the thing, the master can only annihilate what he longs for 
and consumes. Only the servant’s formative labor and activity saves the 
object from total annihilation. Very important here is that Hegel disputes 
his own initial claim that consciousness, for its formation and generality, 
should be detached from reality and abstracted. Hegel first posits abstract 
universality as the main trait of the lord’s consciousness, only to later 
overturn his own premise and show that it is impossible to acquire univer-
sal consciousness in complete detachment from the material world; labor 
is essential to the acquisition of consciousness. Thus neither the servile 
labor of the bondsman, nor the lord’s contact with the world through 
the bondsman’s labor, are adequate means for acquiring consciousness.
This is the reason why Hegel brings forth the Stoicist state of mind. 
Here, consciousness truly exceeds the lord-bondsman confrontation. 
The Stoic manages to sublate the split between the bondsman’s submer-
gence in actual existence and the lord’s abstracted “I.” This happens be-
cause the Stoic subject prefers not to consume at the expense 
of the bondsman, and thus rejects the position of lord. He dispenses with 
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the bondsman, since truly free consciousness is one that is free from de-
pendence on someone else’s labor, and only in the case of such liberation 
is the subject capable of thought, capable of uplifting labor and formative 
activity (Bildung) to thought. Yet, as Hegel emphasizes, despite this act 
of liberating consciousness, Stoicism does not answer the question 
of where the true and the virtuous lies, but instead generates a content-
less thinking — seeking thought in mere reasoning (Ibid: 122).
Thought and thinking do not grasp the living world in this case. 
This is because, despite setting the bondsman free, the Stoic does not 
preserve a tie with the objective world, and thus exacerbates the split be-
tween body and mind to an even greater extent than the feudal lord; 
the lord had at least preserved a minimal tie with the world at the expense 
of bondsman’s labor. As long as the free and enlightened Stoic does not 
need subjugated labor, all former bondsmen are allowed to become free 
independent citizens and to exchange their labor with a former lord on equal 
terms. Meanwhile, the Stoic ex-lord guarantees the ceremony of democ-
racy and equality for the former bondsman, while being tacitly aware 
of his own advantage and superiority. In fact, with this figure of the Stoic, 
Hegel gives the model of the enlightened bourgeois subject who benevo-
lently declines his lordship, yet is nevertheless unable to provide recogni-
tion for those who remain inferior.5
In this situation, inequality and inferiority are disguised by the pro-
cedures of civility and its legislation. It seems at first sight that this new 
fusion of civic equality and a tacit subordination of the inferior packaged 
as civility derives from the stoic’s hegemony in cognition and knowledge 
(Bildung). Yet much more important in preserving his privilege is the sto-
ic’s ataraxia (indifferent equanimity) — the condition that guides the sto-
ic in his non-involvement with the world. It is precisely ataraxia 
that keeps the Stoic’s knowledge (Bildung) appropriated for his own self, 
and prevents him from granting recognition to all those who do not fit 
into the cognitive exigencies of Bildung. Due to this appropriated, exclu-
sive knowledge (ataraxia) the Stoic maintains his tacit and concealed lord-
ship. It is here that the mutation from the former feudal lord to the en-
lightened bourgeois subject takes place.
Thus even when the former bondsman is legally acknowledged 
as free citizen and works as wage laborer, s/he does not become for 
“the Stoic” the subject of knowledge, judgement, and recognition. As long 
as juridically all are equals, it suffices for “the Stoic” to exercise his or her 
civil duty in employing a rhetoric of solidarity for the inferior, instead 
of producing any general ground for converging the two — knowledge and 
5 See also Jason Read’s Politics of Transindividuality for an analysis of how labor 
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the objective world, mind and body, superiority and inferiority. Conse-
quently, those who represent cognitive inferiority are de facto a surplus 
for the Stoic mind, despite any juridical equality or a formal rhetoric 
of the commons.
In fact, as Hegel argues, the Stoic’s ataraxia subsists in the fact that 
even in its detachment from the objective world, the Stoic’s thought does 
not exercise this withdrawal to the full. As Hegel puts it, “[t]his thinking 
consciousness as determined in the form of abstract freedom is thus only 
the incomplete negation of otherness. Withdrawn from existence only 
into itself, it has not there achieved its consummation as absolute nega-
tion of that [existence]” (Ibid: 122). Ataraxia implies this equanimity 
and balance; neither a Marxian zeal of involvement with the worldly, 
nor a radical Nietzschean detachment from the world.
Further on, in Chapter 6 of The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel con-
firms his point by repeating that Stoicism is the consciousness that abus-
es the legal status as abstract form. It formally proclaims the rights 
and independence of every individual, yet it “does not attach its being 
to anything that exists” (Ibid: 291). Consciousness of formal legal right is 
devoid of involvement in reality. Hegel calls the solitary self of the law-
abiding Stoic “impotent,” despite the fact that it manages to obtain 
“a complete supremacy” for such formalized consciousness 
(Ibid: 292, 293)
Does not this position recall the role of the contemporary progres-
sive intellectual, an enlightened subject standing for emancipation, who, 
having no social continuity with the underprivileged, speaks the languag-
es of progressive citizenship, yet has ever been remote from any harsh 
social and cognitive deprivation, and has never been in need of question-
ing his or her own social and cognitive privileges and advantages, 
not to say anything of abandoning them?
***
Now let us look closer at the consequences of this procedure: 
the inferior worker is alleged to be an equal citizen, an average waged la-
borer. Yet while “the Stoic” remains in his realm of privileged cognitive 
production, the inferior former bondsman — who is aware of the falsity 
of civic rhetoric and who feels him or herself to be a surplus in relation 
to the subject of knowledge — simply self-employs with the neo-lord, en-
tering an illusionary heterotopia, a neo-feudal incestual “family,” 
the “sincere” body of a community.
We witness, in this case, the emergence of unofficial heterotopic 
sites — religious communities, esoteric and occult subcultures, shadow 
economies, and mafia brotherhoods — which conceal segregation; they 
contrive a fictitious equality between otherwise unequal social agents. A 
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strange quasi-feudal potlatch takes place then between superiors and in-
feriors. The superior tempts the inferior with informal conduct and care, 
whereas the inferior provides for the superior acts of “unofficial” devotion 
that surpass any social roles and institutions. This explains why the pres-
ent rupture in populist politics is not between the wealthiest and the most 
impoverished, but between the enlightened transnational middle class, 
i.e. the bearers of global knowledge, and the obscurantist local masses. 
Moreover, authoritarian governments and re-feudalized oligarchic clans 
succeed in setting the rage of the masses against the enlightened “Stoics,” 
presenting the latter as global rulers/“experts” contemptuous of the rab-
ble. This quasi-feudal heterotopia of “commons” can easily become a po-
tential site of coercion between the superior and the inferior; 
yet it at least spares “the bondsman” from feeling his or her own redun-
dancy, which is made so painfully obvious in the civic emancipatory rhet-
oric of “the Stoicist.”
It is deplorable that cognitive capitalism, technical excellences, 
and software sociality (Berardi 2017) have converged with contemporary 
“emancipatory” cultural production without extending emancipation to-
wards zones of deprivation. The consequence of this is not only the pro-
gressive intelligentsia’s involuntary and tacit contempt of cognitively il-
legible layers of society, nor the resentment of the traditional and nation-
alist “folk” towards the “intelligentsia,” but the split within capital itself, 
which has created the illusion of two models of capitalism functioning 
simultaneously — global, financial capital, and a resource-oriented, ter-
ritorial, autocratic, and oligarchic one. The latter pretends to be post-cap-
italist in its formal rhetoric, yet remains capitalist in content; both modes 
of capitalism are palpably two sides of the same coin. Post-Fordist capi-
talism has never surpassed primitive accumulation; technocratic accel-
eration and obscurantist fundamentalism remain intertwined. Moreover, 
to repeat again, national, autocratic capital persists in nationalist policies 
not so much because of any essentialist patriotism, but exactly because its 
agents are excluded from the pool of global financial players. For the out-
siders of the global economy, nationalist policies and the essentialization 
of culture become the remedy with which to protect their capitals, 
and “an umbrella” with which to conceal the monetization of the social 
sphere.
The rupture between these two modes of capital engenders a condi-
tion of global civil wars (Alliez and Lazzarato 2017). Resource capital, 
shadow production, and oligarchic finance are unleashing a war against 
global semio-capital, which has itself reached the edge of humanitarian 
catastrophe in dividing humanity into anthropological types according 
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Proletariat — the Premature Subject 
of Enlightenment
Who then could be the universal subject of knowledge and conscious-
ness, able to connect the abstraction of thought with the concrete forma-
tion of things, the body and the mind? Historically, the proletariat was 
considered to be the subject that would acquire a consciousness that 
would be both general in its speculative scale, and concrete in the applica-
tion of this generality within objective existence. It was only the prole-
tariat that was endowed by Marx with the capacity to turn labor into gen-
eralized knowledge and Bildung. In History and Class Consciousness (1971 
[1923]), Lukács claimed that the proletariat’s class consciousness was in 
fact the production of what consciousness must be per se. A similar argu-
ment was made by Andrey Platonov, who wrote that “the soul of the bour-
geoisie is desire and sexuality,” whereas “the soul of the proletariat is 
consciousness” (1988 [1925]: 532).
Сlass consciousness is not a psychological state but a historical con-
dition. Bourgeois consciousness is not yet any consciousness at all, since 
its goals are confined merely to self-interest. Therefore, the bourgeoisie 
as a class resides outside of the historical development of consciousness. 
The bourgeoisie sees the contradictions confronting it as “the outer limits 
of its consciousness” (Lukács 1971 [1923]: 72).6 Meanwhile, the conscious-
ness of the proletariat encompasses the dialectical contradiction between 
its immediate economic interests and its long-term political objectives. 
This means that it is only in the consciousness of the proletariat that not 
only immediate interests, but the objective “good” of the whole society 
can be located (Ibid.: 71).
The proletariat, as we remember, is the class that transcends its ser-
vile social condition by acquiring an almost fantastic stance of conscious-
ness, in which it surpasses its own deprivation to conceptually and onto-
ethically posit the universal withering away of all deprivation. Meanwhile, 
in this acquisition of the universality of consciousness, a proletarian is 
not only the avant-garde of political emancipation or a historical subject, 
but a supreme philosophical subject. It is worth mentioning that in this 
light, Marx’s 11th thesis on Feuerbach — which is traditionally interpret-
ed as a dismissal of speculative philosophy in favor of social practice — 
might acquire a converse meaning. The thesis could be understood, 
on the contrary, as a totalization of philosophy, as positing in the role 
of the enlightened, philosophical subjects precisely the lowest and most 
6 “It is true that the bourgeoisie acts as a class in the objective evolution of 
society. But it understands the process (which it is itself instigating) as something ex-




disadvantaged social strata — thus making philosophy the mundane hab-
it of each and all, rather than proclaiming its expulsion from social 
and political practice. It is in this sense that the proletariat is not only the 
principal subject of deprivation, but also the principal subject of enlight-
enment, mind, thought, and knowledge, embodying the most developed 
stage of consciousness even before it acquires skills in education and tech-
nologies, i.e. before productive forces could have guaranteed such ad-
vancement. The Comintern revolutionaries — notwithstanding their ori-
gins in the intelligentsia, bourgeoisie, or even the gentry — were not dis-
tancing themselves from defending the interests of the oppressed, 
or worse still, pretending to be oppressed themselves (an aberration that 
is often the case with today’s cognitive precariat); they also posited 
the oppressed as the supreme subject of knowledge and thought in creat-
ing the social construct of the proletariat. In this way, they practiced a 
radical anti-ataraxia themselves.7
The Comintern revolutionaries who identified with the proletariat 
might be regarded as “anti-Stoics” who voluntarily dismissed their cogni-
tive hegemony in favor of another, more universal, consciousness out-
lined in the subjectivity of the deprived laborer. What is thus fantastic in 
the notion of the proletariat is that it endows the subject of utmost depri-
vation with a supreme ideational power of mind ahead of any educational, 
cognitive, or institutional amplification of such an act. By means of the 
October revolution, this standpoint is enacted even before Bildung can 
duly be distributed among the socially deprived, i.e. utterly prematurely. 
Let us imagine that someone is alleged to be a philosophical subject be-
fore s/he has acquired the sufficient productive and institutional means, 
or simply skills, to confirm this position. Such an act would be conditioned 
not by condescending overtures to integrate the inferior; but, on the con-
trary, it would engage an ethics in which it is precisely deprivation that 
becomes the point of departure for constructing the universal subject of 
knowledge, thought, and the common good. Such necessity is conditioned 
by the fact that for Marx only the proletarian consciousness — by the to-
ken of its utmost deprivation — can truly mirror the objectivity of being; 
hence it can de facto represent the most generalized, universal, and so-
cialized mode of mind. We have thus a supreme subject of mind/knowl-
edge and the common good before this subject can provide a proper edifi-
cation to represent its role. Yet precisely this premature act of empower-
ing and instituting the still immature subject of enlightenment was the 
paradoxical task of the October revolution. This coercive institution of a 
political economy of radical deprivatization in Soviet society created 
7 In regard to the revolutionary transformation of the gap between the “intel-
ligentsia” and the working class see Igal Halfin’s Language and Revolution. Making Mod-
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a situation in which the relations of production functioned as a common 
good before technological means or productive forces could adequately 
correspond to them. It meant that all infrastructures, things, and humans 
had to perform the social good — including the new politics of knowledge 
and education — ahead of being sufficiently edified or equipped to per-
form such an imperative.
 
***
Hence, contrary to the widespread opinion that the failures of the 
socialist revolution in the USSR were mainly due to insufficient socialism, 
one could argue that the failure and demise of socialism resulted from an 
excess of communist features, rather than from their lack.
According to stereotypical interpretations — both from the right and 
from the left — socialism and its communist components were confined 
to the jargons of ideology and partocracy, and were only formally com-
munist — imposed upon society from above — while societal infrastruc-
ture was not in fact communist or even socialist at all. Antonio Negri sug-
gests that even the sprouts of grassroots proletarian agency that existed 
in the Soviet Union were eradicated by the disciplinary apparatus (2017a). 
Moreover, for Negri, planning and party institutions are equal to capitalist 
accumulation and monopoly on the state’s behalf (2017b: 835–849). Con-
sequently, Soviet society is regarded by him as de facto capitalist, 
and as only formally employing lexicons of the communist ideal.
Étienne Balibar too, in his classic oeuvre, On the Dictatorship of Pro-
letariat, argues that socialism was simply a transition from capitalism 
to communism, and that there was no such thing as the socialist mode 
of production (as against the capitalist and communist ones). Socialism is 
a continuation of class struggle headed by proletariat; it is a democratic 
transformation of capitalism rather than a new episteme and ontology 
of sociality and production (Balibar 1977: 140–145). Consequently, not 
only had Soviet socialism nothing to do with communism, but, it was not 
even socialism at all, as long as the class struggle was terminated with 
Stalin’s leadership.
These views are important. Yet they ignore the two most important 
components of historical socialism. Claiming that Soviet socialism dis-
missed class struggle is to consider struggle within a capitalist logic — as 
the resistance of the disenfranchised class against the privileged, or as the 
critique of the capitalist features of the economy that dominate sociality. 
Yet in historical socialism, class struggle could not have had the same 
form. Within capitalism, the anti-capitalist struggle tends to undermine 
the capitalist system, it revolts against the system. The political-econom-
ic system is grounded in inequality and is thus unfree; then the main syn-
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drome of liberation is to resist this systemic subjugation. In socialism it is 
the other way around. It is the political-economic system that is deter-
mined by equality, and hence the system itself is even freer than mundane 
sociality; it is oriented toward the common good much more than ’ordi-
nary life’ and its particularities are; hence sociality has to stretch toward 
the system rather than subvert it. For example, when the system of pro-
duction and wage remuneration equalized the income of laborers of vari-
ous skills in socialist countries, separate social groups or individuals were 
critical of such a tendency, as it neutralized qualification of the work done 
and blocked any opportunity for surplus incomes for those specific, more 
skilled social groups. Contrary to the stereotype that socialist society was 
falsely socialist as it was ruled by the dogmatic imperatives of partocracy, 
I would argue that the party was simply the organ responsible for the pro-
visions of the common good — yet the communist hypothesis is broader 
than the party. Thus historically, the party itself rather aspired to become 
worthy of the communist condition, often avowing its own deviations. 
The struggle then is not in transgressing, but in correlating the already 
established communist components within socialism. In that sense, his-
torical socialism was nothing but the perpetual front line of class struggle 
in every field against the remaining traits of capitalism; so that the strug-
gle turned into a permanent vigilance against any fascination with capi-
talism and its traits — in cultural politics, economics, and social life. 
In fact, the civil war never ended in the media, culture, and art of the So-
viets. Once many traits of communism have already been established 
in a society, each citizen and his or her consciousness becomes the site 
of such a battle. Class struggle evolves into a regime of self-critique 
and of constant anti-capitalist vigilance.
Balibar’s view of historical socialism does not take into account 
the logical paradox that inheres in the epistemological, ontological, 
and temporal overturning caused by the October revolution. Even if it is 
true that socialism was an insufficient communism, it was so not because 
the communist components were too remote from socialism and were yet 
to be achieved in its political economy and social infrastructure, 
but on the contrary; communism remained yet remote because too many 
communist components had already been established in the political 
economy, education system, and relations of production ahead of time — 
yet human factors and drawbacks in production had rendered those com-
munist components unimplementable. Hence the inevitability of the so-
cialist modality of transition. The Bolsheviks’ resort to NEP is a classic 
case that exemplifies this point. Thus the temporal paradox inheres not in 
the fact that socialism is a transitory stage after capitalism, 
and that it therefore knows little of communism. On the contrary: pre-
cisely because the October revolution achieves too many of the conditions 
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nomic system becomes more communist than life itself, communism in-
evitably manifests itself in the guise of socialism.
The dictatorship of proletariat is then the inner moral code of any 
subject. It subsists in the criminalization of any deviation from the prin-
ciple of the common good and is not in need of the classical perpetual 
anti-capitalist antagonism between the less and the more privileged, 
as long as revolution has already criminalized class antagonism and insti-
tuted the proletariat’s dictatorship as law. So the aporia of the struggle 
for more communism after a successful revolution is not in further resis-
tance to capital; after the socialist revolution, the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat and class struggle are aimed at preserving and equipping an al-
ready achieved condition of social classlessness; which is too difficult 
to sustain because productive forces and consciousness have not yet fully 
matured to its level.
To repeat, the logical puzzle with Soviet socialism was that its polit-
ical-economic systems contained more elements of communism 
and a bigger dose of socialism than daily existence. If this were not so, 
the economic infrastructure of Soviet sociality would not have generated 
so many shadow areas in production, trade, planning, etc. — confirming 
a hidden human craving and desire for capitalist modes of life. The issue 
lay not simply in the rigidity and inflexibility of networks of production, 
but first and foremost in an incapacity to endure the severe experience 
of a non-surplus economy.
Let’s imagine a worker as a proletarian that is announced already 
in situ, hic et nunc, a universal historical subject of the common good, 
knowledge, and thought, but it might be that s/he has not yet acquired the 
productive forces, or even the capacities, that would match this universal-
ity. The question lies not at all in dividing the proletariat into those prop-
er and false, nor in dividing the Soviet project into an immaculate system 
and flawed individuals. Rather, the incompatibility between the system 
and life is engendered by the almost inhuman provisions of the common 
good, in case they happen to be fully realized.
We can introduce a quasi-theological comparison to this scenario. 
Let’s imagine that a utopia is, paradoxically, already accomplished before 
it is duly projected and organized. Let’s infer that we get into the paradise 
abruptly and materially, despite our sins, and before our sins have been 
atoned, i.e. even before we are prepared ourselves for paradise, and re-
gardless of whether we would like at all to be there. In this case paradise 
would seem a torture. The Orthodox sermon traditionally posits that hell 
does not exist. God created neither evil nor hell. They have no ontology. 
God gave freedom to human beings (including freedom to sin) merely be-
cause it was in freedom that a human being’s likeness to God could be 
confirmed. Thus hell has no special location and is not meant as any spe-
cial punishment for the sinner. Hell is simply the incapacity to sin when 
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one still desires to sin, when being in paradise makes sinning empirically 
impossible. Yet it is too difficult to get rid of the desire to sin when one 
gets into paradise ahead of time, prematurely. Thus the sinner needs and 
desires to commit certain acts, which are empirically unimplementable in 
paradise and therefore cause suffering to the “sinner,” who is unable 
to “sin.” (For example, in paradise there is no body, and hence no bodily 
affects and desires; but if we get into paradise, preserving our bodily af-
fects, desires and passions, we will find them empirically unimple-
mentable in paradise, simply by the token of the absence of empirical 
bodily functions in the paradisiсal afterlife.) Therefore the struggle to 
sustain oneself in paradise would consist in fitting into and stretching 
toward an already attained paradise, it would be in unlearning to commit 
acts that are unimplementable in paradise, and even in getting rid of such 
a desire.
Similarly with an already existing socialism or communism: one is 
already inscribed into communist surroundings, but one cannot endure it, 
because one’s desires (on the imaginary and phantasmatic level) are still 
with capitalism, with “sin.” In this case, sin (capitalism) continues to ex-
ist, but only as one’s private longing for sin, and despite one’s being al-
ready in paradise (communism). Consequently, it makes no sense to criti-
cize or to resist “the nightmare of paradise” for the sinner, if it is simply 
his or her imperfection which makes of that paradise a hell. Critique of 
one’s own sin would not mitigate the suffering; only the cessation of sin, 
flight from paradise, or sheer cancellation of the regime of paradise could 
put a stop to the sinner’s suffering.
In a situation in which utopia becomes a social and even material 
fact, when it is an immanent present reality, one is permanently under the 
threat of not being adequate to the already existing social good. Hence 
the obsession in Soviet art, literature, culture, and philosophy with adapt-
ing to the laws of communist society rather than evading them. The con-
tinuation of the revolutionary act would thus consist in stretching toward 
the social commons, in striving for adequacy with them, rather than in 
fleeing from a societal structure perceived as power, authority, or appara-
tuses.
Consequently, it is important to keep in mind the epistemic diver-
gences between capitalist and non-capitalist societies when engaging in 
self-critique and emancipatory resistance. For example, for Althusser, 
self-critique and philosophical theory were aimed at sustaining class 
struggle. Yet in both theory and practice, class struggle could only evolve 
against the existing ideas of the common good and established social 
goals, in so far as they were for Althusser the ideological traps of bour-
geois sociality and its false humanism. In a post-revolutionary non-capi-
talist society, conversely, various modes of achieved equality are so much 
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of a newly fashioned bourgeoisie, that the struggle is not between 
the existing social groups, but is aimed against the imaginaries of bour-
geois life, its potential reemergence and its political economy; i.e. 
the struggle becomes the defense of the already acquired ethics of non-
capitalist relations of production, rather than transgression of the exist-
ing rules of social apparatuses.
Thus, the actual involvement of the cognitive class in a progressive 
politics of the common good would only be possible on the condition that 
one goes beyond mere solidarity between the middle class (“cognitariat”) 
and the proletariat: the middle class, notwithstanding its cognitive supe-
riority, would have to sacrifice its subjectivity by ceding primacy to the 
proletariat as the subject of history (of production and knowledge). 
This was the idea behind Soviet socialism — the idea that the present day 
cognitariat is unable to realize. This is because, as John Roberts writes in 
the introduction to his Self-Love and the Love of Capitalism, the link be-
tween working class experience and systemic social transformation has 
become incoherent and discontinuous (Roberts 2019: 11).
Conclusion
Thus, the radical and premature endowment of the proletariat with 
social and cognitive hegemony in the Soviet Union evolved as the utmost 
socialization of former inequalities, guaranteeing social hegemony to the 
proletariat. Yet interestingly, it is exactly this coercive securing of social 
equality — which presupposed the decline of struggle in the form it had 
taken under capitalist conditions of inequality — that was often misun-
derstood in the Althusserian and post-Althusserian critique of the Soviet 
Union as the rejection of social struggle and as the pacification of class 
antagonisms (Althusser 1976).
The October revolution is thus an example of how a political decision 
about the proletariat’s social and cognitive hegemony precedes the infra-
structural and technological back-up of emancipatory procedures. This is 
because there is no independent ontology of techno-intelligences or cy-
bernetic expansions that generate sociality, as was the idea of Gilbert Si-
mondon (Simondon 2016). It is the other way round: the will for new so-
ciality constructs and determines the goals for the overall development of 
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